A vehicle operates on a road construction project funded by the New Development Bank in Pará, Brazil, on 18 May 2022 

Among the topics on the table for the next BRICS Summit in South Africa, we could highlight those related to the use of national currencies for intra-BRICS trade relations and the expansion of the grouping. A third topic deserves greater attention: cooperation in digital infrastructure for developing a digital economy and governance. 

While the proposal to have a common BRICS currency is currently out of the question, the one that aims to expand agreements to finance bilateral trade in the national currency has gained strength among the five countries. The risks to economic sovereignty arising from excessive dependence on the US currency and the need to reduce transaction costs in intra-BRICS trade relations make this agenda item a priority. 

The process of de-dollarisation of the global economy will be slow. Still, it seems irreversible and driven by China’s dedicated diplomatic effort to promote the yuan in its relations with its partner countries. Most trade deals between Russia and China are already being conducted between the Russian ruble and yuan. The agreement between China and Brazil to facilitate the direct transaction between the Brazilian real and the yuan in bilateral commercial operations was well accepted in Brazil, signalling that Brazilian economic actors are receptive to this measure. 

Delicate issue 

The same cannot be said about the expansion of the BRICS. That is a delicate issue due to the change in international geopolitics that the expansion of the group could bring. Since it proposed BRICS Plus, China has already been signalling that it wants to expand the BRICS grouping. For its part, Brazil understood that outreach dialogues with countries invited to participate in the summits were sufficient. 

But recently, the proposed expansion of the BRICS grouping gained new impetus due to an “external stimulus.” More than 40 countries have expressed interest in definitively joining the grouping. What is the reason for this growing interest in the BRICS grouping, which, in its early years, was seen with a certain skepticism by the international community, especially Western powers? The search for inclusive and results-oriented multilateralism may be one of the answers to this question. 

However, some analysts argue that expanding the BRICS grouping could weaken it by making decision-making more difficult. Others point to the risk of the BRICS grouping being seen by the international community as a G20 of developing countries or a smaller-scale version of the G77. Some consider the membership requests made by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and the United Arab Emirates as the formation of an anti-democratic bloc or with an anti-Western profile. Some say that the expansion of the BRICS grouping is in China’s exclusive interest. 

Even though it may serve the Chinese national interest (and all countries seek to defend their national interests), the expansion of the BRICS grouping could dilute rather than concentrate Chinese power. It is true that the increase in the number of countries is a challenge for the grouping, but this fact can only stifle it if there are no well-established objectives and work methods. The lack of institutionalisation, in this case, is a problem.  

BRICS would not become a new G20 or a version of the G77 either. The reformist global governance agenda for inclusive multilateralism is a hallmark of the BRICS grouping. This defines and sets it apart from the G20 or the former G77. The BRICS grouping is also not a bloc that configures itself as “anti-anything” - just read carefully the declarations of all the summits. If it is not a bloc dedicated to promoting democracy in the domestic sphere of each country, neither is it a bloc that is against a democratic regime. The focus of the BRICS grouping at the domestic level of each of its members is on the socioeconomic development of its people. 

Brazil and India are reticent about the expansion of the BRICS. They understand that it is necessary to define the criteria for accepting new members. About Brazil, President Lula showed sympathy for the entry of Venezuela, which did not even ask to join the grouping, but the same emphasis is not seen when it comes to supporting Argentina’s request. Criteria are missing. The possibility of Argentina joining the BRICS does not seem to please a part of the Brazilian government, and Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs fears that Brazil will see its influence reduced in its relationship with the other BRICS countries.  

For Brazil, Argentina’s entry into the BRICS needs to be inserted into a framework that meets the interests of Brazilian foreign policy. The problem is that the Lula government has not yet defined this framework. The Lula government’s support for Argentina’s entry into the NDB does not resolve this question, but points to a direction. 

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (fourth right, front) attends the inauguration ceremony of the West-East Integration Railway to be built with Chinese assistance in Ilhéus, Bahia, Brazil, on 4 July 

Need for institutionalisation 

We know that the BRICS is not an international organisation. In this sense, there are no pre-set rules regarding the accession of new members. The accession process became, for this reason, too open and eminently political. This is the moment to propose the institutionalisation of the BRICS, that is, to make it an international organisation, albeit with a simplified institutional structure. The discussion about the criteria for joining new members is typical for the Constitutive Agreement of an international organisation and would provide greater legal and political security for all. Furthermore, effective institutionalisation creates the conditions for more transparent management, less dependence on one country or another, and more protection for the grouping against external interference. 

Better than focusing on the discussion about who joins the BRICS and who does not is to focus on “putting the house in order” and giving it the structure it deserves to guarantee an even better future for the BRICS. 

Finally, the BRICS countries must take advantage of their potential for intense cooperation to develop their agendas connected to new technologies and promote a digital infrastructure. This is the future for the BRICS. This theme is associated with its institutionalisation, which could benefit from technological advances for a more effective, simplified, and easily accessible institutional structure for all BRICS people.