Despite international and regional efforts for the resolution of Mali's political, constitutional and military crisis, the situation remains challenging in many ways. Northern Mali is still an epicenter of tension and localized violence, notwithstanding efforts to make and consolidate gains. In the midst of the talks in Algiers by various organizations and the proliferation of Sahel strategies, the Institute for Security Studies, an African organization which aims to enhance human security on the continent, held a seminar in October at their head office in Pretoria, South Africa, to understand the dynamics of the situation in Mali and the Sahel, as well as the African Union's (AU) strategy for addressing the crisis. The Sahel is the transitional zone between the arid Sahara Desert of northern Africa and the belt of humid savannas to the south.
Speaking on the nature and history of the ongoing crisis in northern Mali, Dr. Issaka Souare, a Bamako-based special advisor to the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, said the region has seen about three major waves of rebellion since the 1960s. The first wave, generally known as the Alfellaga, was launched from Kidal between 1962 and 1964. Despite being low intensity, it saw attacks from rebels and subsequent tough responses from the Malian military. This was followed by the second and major wave in the mid-1990s, generally called the Aljebha between 1990 and 1996. This time, the movements were more organized, resourced and were relatively popular in the region, with many refugees returning from other parts of the region. The second wave ended through a peace agreement negotiated in southern Algeria. However, it could not resolve the situation permanently as the mid-2000s saw the emergence of the third wave, led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, from 2006 to 2009. The marked difference between the current instability in Mali, which has plagued the country since 2012, and the previous waves, is the infusion of terrorism into the matrix of issues and engagements.
Dr. Souare blamed the nature of political governance and deep-seated issues and perceptions as some of the most important underlying drivers of the conflict. Other causes include weak state presence, criminality (terrorism and trafficking), and the fallout from the Libyan crisis.
In response to the crisis, a number of international and regional efforts have been rolled out to address it. Following the 2012 military coup in Mali, the AU and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) both resolutely condemned the unconstitutional change of government and the rebellion in northern Mali. Together with other important international pressure mounted on the actors in the crisis, there is an ongoing peace process.
International peacekeeping interventions in the situation have seen a move from an intended ECOWAS-led Mission in Mali (MICEMA), to the initial deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and the eventual takeover of AFISMA by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on April 25, 2013. The European Union's military training mission has also played important roles in containing the situation. The intention to deploy MICEMA by ECOWAS was a direct appreciation of the regional nature of the conflict. However, the response was continentalized because certain countries affected by the conflict, such as Algeria, were not necessarily ECOWAS members. Currently, there are varied Sahel strategies by the AU, UN, EU and ECOWAS, each working in various ways to contain the crisis.
The multidimensional nature of the conflict and the indispensability of coherence in international support in the midst of the many existing Sahel strategies must be taken into account, along with the need for regional cooperation. It is difficult for any country to single-handedly monitor the Sahel region and to effectively make any sustainable impact without concerted efforts from others. The seminar discussed the need to isolate terrorists both in terms of words and action as the basis for taking undue attention away from such groups, while emphasizing the importance of African financial autonomy in its quest for peace and security on the continent.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees said that in September, more than 240,000 Malians were internally displaced and refugees in other Sahel countries. The financial requirement for Mali in 2014 is set at $59.8 million. ( The writer is a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.) |